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Abstract 
Insider threats, or attacks against a company from within, are a pressing issue both 
domestically and internationally.  Frequencies of these threats increase each year adding to the 
overall importance of further research analysis.  In fact, many case studies have been conducted 
which state that these employees who participate in insider attacks tend to exhibit certain 
personality and characteristic traits, as well as certain observable behaviors, that would indicate 
to other employees that an attack is imminent.  It is hypothesized that companies will be able to 
take a more preventative stance of security as opposed to a reactive stance by identifying these 
characteristics and behaviors, as well as the motivations that drive them.  In order to accomplish 
this task, companies must implement multiple layers of technological means of security, as well 
as take a more hands-on, holistic approach with company-wide involvement. 
 
Keywords: Honors Thesis; Insider; Threat; Characteristics; Behaviors; Holistic Approach; 
Technology; Risk. 
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Introduction 
Every year, companies spend a significant amount of money on security means to protect 
their assets against outsider attackers, such as hackers.  However, there is a more serious and 
pressing issue that companies around the world face, against which few are well protected: the 
issue of insider threats.  Even though few companies understand and prepare for insider threats, 
insider attacks appear to be growing in frequency each year (Butavicius et al., 2012).  In 2004, it 
was “estimated that over 80% of information security incidents for the past four years are the 
result of insiders” (Andrews et al., 2004, p. 14).  This statistic is staggering given that it is 
estimated that the frequency of attacks has been growing ever since (Carter et al., 2012).  Given 
the financial damage that insiders inflict on companies, it is arguable that they are worse than 
outsider attacks.   In fact, “A recent FBI survey reported that the average cost of a successful 
attack by a malicious insider is nearly 50 times greater than the cost of an external attack” 
(Andrews et al., 2004, p. 14).  Not only can insiders cause damage to the information assets of 
the company, but physical damage and damage to the company’s reputation as well, all of which 
cause financial damage (Liang et al., 2012).  What is even more concerning is the thought of 
adversarial insiders working within “government facilities dealing with materials that can cause 
such unacceptable catastrophic impact” (Hershkowitz, 2007, p. 106).  However, arguably the 
biggest issue regarding insider threats is the fact that most companies are unprepared for an 
insider attack; they lack proper understanding of insiders, and thus are unable to identify the 
problem before it occurs.  It is hypothesized that, by identifying certain characteristics and 
behaviors of insiders, as well as their motivations, companies can take a more preventative 
stance against insider threats by implementing layers of technological means of security as well 
as a holistic, companywide approach in order to identify and reduce the insider threat.  In order 
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to do this, it is necessary to develop a definition of an insider threat; then, the characteristics, 
behaviors and motivations of insider threats will be identified; once these have been identified, a 
few technological means of preventative security will be discussed; finally, the holistic approach 
that companies must take to ensure optimal protection will be discussed.  First, a working 
definition of an insider threat must be developed. 
 
Literature Review 
 There are three main sources that merit discussion for this paper: Butavicius et al.’s 
“Preventing and Profiling Malicious Insider Attacks”; Colwill’s “Human Factors in Information 
Security: The Insider Threat – Who Can You Trust These Days”; and The National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan 2013.  Butavicius et al. and Colwill’s articles discuss insider threats more in-
depth, such as their personality traits as well as other studies that have been conducted regarding 
the insider threat issue.  The NIPP, however, discusses protection against threats in general.  All 
three of these documents provide some of the most beneficial information used in this paper.   
 The aim of Butavicius et al.’s (2012) article is to identify and discuss specific information 
regarding the individuals that commit insider threats, including personality traits and observable 
behaviors, as well as personnel, policy and technical responses companies can take for a holistic 
response to insider threats.  What is very beneficial about this article is the fact that the authors 
list and briefly explain a few previous research studies conducted regarding insider threat 
identification and prevention.  The authors also implement the research and statistics obtained 
from these studies their own study as a means of backing up their claims.  After listing and 
discussing the different means of identifying and preventing insider threats, they end their article 
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by discussing in what ways future research could be conducted in order to be more completely 
prepared for insider threats.   
 There are few limitations and biases within this article that must be discussed.  The first 
limitation is the fact that this article was produced for the Australian Government with research 
collected from insider attacks in Australia.  The reason this is a limitation is because not all 
insider threats will be the same among different countries; that is, just because the number of 
insider attacks is rising in Australia does not mean that it is a growing problem in the United 
States as well.  This is why it is important that a foreign report was included within this paper to 
show that the insider threat problem is growing not only in the United States, but in other 
countries as well.  Another limitation presented in this article is the limited amount of research 
conducted up to this point regarding the insider threat problem in Australia.  The authors 
themselves state that “it is strongly recommended that further research be undertaken” (2012, p. 
3).  It is for this reason that this paper analyzed a large number of research studies and other 
articles regarding insider threats in order to have a more accurate representation of the issue.  
The final limitation of this article is the fact that it cites only five studies conducted on insider 
threats for the entire report.  Although limited research had been conducted on the issue up until 
2012, it would have behooved the authors to use a larger amount of studies and research for a 
more accurate representation of the problem.  Besides these few examples, and due to the fact 
that the authors discuss them, there appear to be very few limitations in this article.  The authors 
themselves do not appear to have many biases as well given that they are all research scientists 
with disciplines focused in cognitive and social psychology.  Butavicius also conducted research 
regarding protection and simulation training.  The only bias that these authors may exhibit is the 
fact that they appear to have little experience regarding protection against insider threats.   
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 The aim of Colwill’s (2009) is to provide an explanation of the different characteristics 
exhibited by insider threats and the reactions taken by companies in order to prevent it them from 
attacking.  In the article, he explains that mitigation is a key factor of risk management rather 
than simply reacting to an attack.  In the end, he provides a number of solutions that can reduce 
the amount of insider threats a company faces, such as security policies, education and the 
maintenance of trustworthy relationships.  In the article, Colwill cites both public and private 
sector organizations and individuals for his statistics regarding insider characteristics, different 
means of security and the effectiveness of different mitigation techniques. 
 There are few limitations within Colwill’s article.  As with the previous article, Colwill 
collected and analyzed statistics based on insider attacks within the United Kingdom.  Thus, his 
statistics may differ significantly from those acquired by the United States or any other country.  
Another limitation is the fact that this article was published in 2009.  Because of this, the 
statistics acquired by Colwill are a little dated and may not represent the problem as it is in 2016.  
Colwill’s citations may also be in question depending on how much research he conducted on 
the individuals and institutions that published the information he utilized; however, this can be 
said essentially for any report.  Colwill himself also does not appear to have any visible biases 
regarding insider threats or the steps necessary in preventing them.  Having said that, the use of 
Colwill’s article benefits this paper significantly given the information it provides.   
 The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 2013 is essentially a guidebook 
established by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for protecting the nation’s critical 
infrastructure.  Within this plan, the DHS lays out its vision, mission and goals when protecting 
the nation’s critical infrastructure.  It defines a large number of concepts necessary for 
understanding risk management and critical infrastructure.  The plan also establishes “seven core 
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tenets, representing the values and assumptions the critical infrastructure community should 
consider (at the national, regional, SLTT, and owner and operator levels) when planning for 
critical infrastructure security and resilience” (2013, p. 13).  It goes on to list and define a five 
step process of risk management which can be used at any level (local, national, etc.).  It ends by 
discussing twelve “calls to action” in order to build partnerships, manage risks and focus on 
outcomes.  The section primarily used for this paper is the five-step process of risk management.  
The reason this information is so vital to preventing insider threats is due to the fact that it can be 
used in any environment both in the public and private sector.  No matter the size of the 
company, this process can be utilized in order to identify the company’s assets and the threats to 
said assets.  The use of the plan for this paper is also very efficient due to the fact that it 
combines risk, threat and vulnerability assessments into a single management process, all of 
which are useful when preventing insider threats.   
 Given that the plan is a United States Government prepared document, there are 
practically no limitations to its use.  Having said that, there is the issue discussed with the 
previous articles of non-representativeness to other countries.  However, a solution to this 
limitation for future research is to gather information and statistics from multiple countries.  
Another limitation when using this plan is the vocabulary it uses, i.e. infrastructure.  Because this 
plan is prepared for a national scale as opposed to the private sector, companies and individuals 
may be confused on when and how to use this plan.  However, once they have read and analyzed 
it, they will understand that it is a simple plan that can be used on all levels in both the public and 
private sector.  The only other limitation or bias observable in this plan is that it can be taken as 
an answer to all risk and threat problems, which is not the case.  This plan must be conducted 
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carefully and thoroughly and must also be combined with other means of threat and vulnerability 
assessments in order to ensure optimal protection of a company’s assets or infrastructure. 
 
Research Design 
 This study utilizes qualitative analysis research in order to acquire and analyze data to 
support the theory that insider threats can be identified by certain characteristics, behaviors and 
motivators, and can be prevented through a combination of a technological and holistic 
approach.  The sources researched for this paper are a combination of government and public 
sector case studies.  There are three variables to consider when determining the consistency of 
the theory presented: the characteristics of insiders; the observable behaviors of insiders; and the 
motivators that drive insiders.   
Operationalization of Variables 
 The first variable analyzed was the certain characteristics that employees exhibit which 
indicate that they are insiders or are more likely to turn insiders.  These identified characteristics 
can be measured nominally to determine whether or not an individual is or is likely to become an 
insider.  By reviewing past incidents regarding insider attacks, researchers may be able to 
indicate which characteristics employees exhibited that indicated a possible attack, which is what 
most of the researchers did in the case studies reviewed for this paper.  The manner in which this 
variable was obtained and analyzed for this paper was by conducting research on studies that 
professionals and experts have performed on past insider attacks on public sector companies.  
The information gathered from this variable will be measured with logical argumentation and 
comparisons. 
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 The second variable analyzed was the observable behaviors of insiders.  After reviewing 
many professional articles regarding insider threats, it was found that insiders usually exhibit 
certain observable behaviors along with personality traits and characteristics.  As with the first 
variable, this information can acquired by reviewing studies conducted in the past by experts 
regarding insider threats.  These studies can be compared and contrasted to determine which 
behaviors employees exhibit indicate that they were in the process of attacking the company’s 
assets or had already attacked.  The information acquired for this variable will be measured with 
logical argumentation and comparisons as well.  
 The third variable measured in this study was the motivators that drive employees to turn 
insiders.  These motivations can range from personal gain to revenge et al.  As with the other 
variables, this information for this variable was acquired from scholarly articles and past research 
studies conducted on insider threat attacks.  Another means by which this information can be 
acquired is by personally interviewing the insiders themselves and asking the motivators which 
caused them to act.  However, due to time constraints, the sole means of acquiring information 
on insider motivators was by reviewing case studies conducted by professionals in the field of 
physical and national security.  As with the other variables, the information gathered for this 
variable will be analyzed by means of logical argumentation and comparison.   
Population 
 The population for this study includes security managers, government officials, 
professional researchers and university professors who have an extensive knowledge on the 
subject of insider threats in the public sector.  This study would not be adequate if it were to use 
another type of population given that the individuals would lack the proper knowledge of insider 
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threats, their characteristics, their behaviors and motivators, and means of preventing insider 
attacks.  Due to time constraints, this population is adequate for this study. 
 
Limitations 
 As mentioned previously in the literature review, there are obviously some limitations 
regarding the sources researched for this study and the information acquired from them.  One of 
the main limitations is that some of the case studies date back at least ten years; this could result 
in an inaccurate representation of the insider threat today.  Another possible limitation discussed 
is the fact that, where this study focuses mainly on insider threats in the United States, some of 
the articles used were conducted by other countries, such as the United Kingdom.  Another 
limitation could be a lack of information regarding identifying and preventing insider threats in 
the United States.  However, ample amounts of information are presented that answer the 
research question and support the theory presented. 
 
Results 
Defining Insider Threats 
 Before proceeding, a definition of “insider threats” must be established.  Because little 
information has been developed concerning insider threats and the different types of insiders, 
there are multiple definitions used in order to describe them.  Essentially, there are two basic 
categories of insiders: adversarial insiders, or those who purposefully commit malicious acts 
(usually for personal gain); and unintentional insiders, or those who commit malicious acts either 
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by accident or due to negligence.  Insiders can be anyone who has access to the company’s 
information systems and networks, such as employees, contractors, consultants, etc. (Butavicius 
et al., 2012).  Insiders may also include third-party business partners and their employees, 
temporary help (Schultz, 2002), and even supervisors and managers.  Larry Knutsen, member of 
the Laconia National Security Consulting Group, states that “privileged users, those who have 
been granted exclusive access to data within a company, are a major concern for organizations. 
Those given that status should be monitored closely because they have exceptional access to the 
data” (Magnuson & Sicard, 2015, p. 10).  Insiders do not have to currently work for the 
company; rather, insiders can also include previous employees who have had access to the 
network and systems (DHS, 2014).  In essence, an insider can generally be defined as “anyone 
with knowledge of operation or security systems and who has unescorted access to facilities or 
security interests” (Biringer et al., 2007, p. 55).  Having discussed this information and provided 
a very high level definition of an insider threat, it is necessary to discuss the two categories of 
insider threats, as well as the actions that the individuals in these categories commit in order to 
be labeled as an insider threat.  Once that is complete, a more refined and formal definition of 
insider threats can be established.  First, a discussion of adversarial insiders is necessary.   
Adversarial Insiders 
 When gathering data on insider threats and the types of insiders, the United Kingdom’s 
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure sums up the category of adversarial insiders 
with their definition of an insider: “a person who exploits, or has the intention to exploit, their 
legitimate access to an organization’s assets for unauthorized purposes” (CPNI, 2013, p. 6).  As 
mentioned previously, the “unauthorized purposes”, or motives, can include a number of 
different reasons which will be discussed later.  There is also a multitude of different types of 
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adversarial insiders.  In his book, “Risk Analysis and Security Countermeasure Selection”, 
Thomas Norman discusses six categories of adversarial insiders: Class 1 Terrorists; Class 5 
Terrorists; Sophisticated Economic Criminals; Unsophisticated Criminals; Lone Criminals; 
Cause Oriented Subversives (2016).  Norman discusses Hackers as a seventh category, but due to 
the definition of insider threats that will be used for this paper, these two categories would not be 
considered as an insider threat.   
The first category Norman discusses is Class 1 Terrorists.  Norman defines Class 1 
Terrorists as government trained and supported professionals whose sole purpose is to infiltrate 
the intelligence communities of other countries (2016).  He states that these individuals are 
usually recruited from the adversarial country’s intelligence community, military, secret service, 
etc.  The second group Norman discusses is Class 5 Terrorists.  These are amateur civilians with 
basic terrorist experience who attempt actions of theft and violence against industry information 
and assets.  These individuals may work alone, or may form militia-like groups.  The third group 
of insiders is Sophisticated Economic Criminals.  These individuals have the knowledge and 
tools to accomplish their goals of acquiring information or destroying assets.  These individuals 
can be the insiders themselves, or outsiders in collusion with insiders.  The fourth group Norman 
discusses is Unsophisticated Criminals.  These are individuals who have access to the systems 
and networks, but pose little threat to the organization due to their lack of skills or knowledge.  
Norman states that simple theft of information or assets can be included in this category of 
insiders.  The fifth group Norman discusses is Lone Criminals, individuals who work alone in 
order to steal or destroy company information and assets.  Norman states that Sophisticated and 
Unsophisticated Criminals can fall in this category as well.  The sixth category in Norman’s list 
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is Cause-Oriented Subversives, individuals and activist groups who commit acts of theft and 
destruction due to their opposition to the government, an industry, religion, etc. (2016).   
As mentioned above, Norman includes Hackers as a seventh category.  A hacker can be 
generally defined as “a malicious or criminally minded outsider who seeks to cause damage to 
organizations or individuals for financial gain or personal notoriety” (Steele & Wargo, 2007, p. 
24).  Hackers “circumvent security and break into a network, computer, file, etc., usually with 
malicious intent” (www.dictionary.com).  In their article “Intrusion Detection: Perspectives on 
the Insider threat”, Andrews et al. state that “All insider attacks must use local resources 
(operating system components, installed applications, network appliances and so forth) in order 
to carry out their purpose” (2004, p. 14).  Because insiders have access to the organization’s 
networks, systems and other technology, they are not required to breach or break into the 
organization’s systems.  Therefore, Hackers would not be considered an insider threat.  Having 
briefly defined and discussed the different types of adversarial insiders, it is important to discuss 
some of the many methods utilized in order to accomplish their goals of information and asset 
theft and destruction. 
Adversarial Insider Activity 
In their study, the United Kingdom’s CPNI defines five main types of insider activity that 
it identified in its experiment: “unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information; process 
corruption; facilitation of third party access to an organization’s assets; physical sabotage; and 
electronic or IT sabotage” (2013, p. 4).  Of these five, the two most frequent acts committed by 
adversarial insiders were the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information and process 
corruption.  Ironically, electronic sabotage was found to be committed the least frequently.  Also, 
the CPNI found that the vast majority of individuals were self-initiated, meaning they saw an 
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opportunity for personal gain (or other motives) and initiated the attack themselves without any 
outside influence.  As previously mentioned, hackers are not considered insiders for the sake of 
this paper.  However, insiders may still utilize hacker tools on the Internet (such as automated 
tools) in order to commit malicious acts from within (Jeong et al., 2012).  Insiders may also 
utilize coercion tactics to acquire Internet Protocol credentials from a coworker with access 
(Agrafiotis et al., 2015).  Other tactics include the installation of backdoors into information 
systems, overloading the network or systems, and even utilizing social network sites to recruit 
other individuals as insiders (Jeong et al., 2012).  Finally, it is important to note employees 
taking advantage of telework, or working from outside the workplace.  According to Jeong et al., 
in order to increase productivity, more companies are providing employees with mobile access to 
their networks and information systems.  This remote access, Jeong et al. argue, opens up more 
vulnerabilities for adversarial insiders to attack.  They state that “a previous study on insider 
threat also concluded that 56% of the insider threat attacks were launched via remote access 
whereas 35% occurred inside the organization and 8% of attacks used a combination of the 
workplace and remote access” (2012, p. 185).  As will be discussed in the holistic approach to 
preventing insider threats section, companies and organizations need to ensure that all means of 
security are being implemented when allowing such freedom to the employees.   Having 
discussed the tactics, tools, and methods of adversarial insider attacks, it is necessary to define 
and discuss the unintentional insider threat, as well as the means by which unintentional insider 
attacks are performed. 
Unintentional Insiders 
The CERT Insider Threat Team of the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon 
University conducted a foundational study on unintentional insider threats in 2013 which was 
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produced for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  In this study, the team creates a 
definition of an unintentional insider comprised of four main parts.  The first part states that an 
unintentional insider is “a current or former employee, contractor, or business partner” (2013, p. 
1).  This part of the definition does not differ from the adversarial insider, or insider threats in 
general.  The second part states that an unintentional insider “has or had authorized access to an 
organization’s network, system, or data” (2013, p. 1).  This part also discussed adversarial 
insiders, stating that individuals can only be insiders if they have access to and utilize the 
organization’s network, systems, or technology.  The third part states that unintentional insiders 
create threats “through action or inaction without malicious intent” (2013, p. 1).  It is this part 
which differentiates unintentional insiders from adversarial insiders.  The final part states that, 
through this inaction or action without malicious intent, the unintentional insider “causes harm or 
substantially increases the probability of future serious harm to the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of the organization’s information or information systems” (2013, p. 1).  As with the 
first two parts of this definition, the final part of the definition of an unintentional insider does 
not differ from an adversarial insider if the outcome is the same whether the act was 
unintentional or meant to be malicious.  Having defined unintentional insiders, it is necessary to 
explain the means by which they cause damage to an organization’s assets.   
Unintentional Insider Activity 
When it comes to unintentional insider threats, human error essentially plays the main 
role in causing substantial amounts of damage to an organization’s assets.  The CERT Insider 
Threat Team provides a multitude of ways that human error affects employees and causes insider 
threats.  One of the main examples the team provides is fatigue and situational awareness.  
According to the team, “If employees within a computing environment are sleepy . . .they may 
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exhibit decreased attentiveness and increased inappropriate responses to critical network security 
information” (2013, p. 8).  Essentially, if IT employees, or any employees within the 
organization for that matter, are plagued by fatigue, their situational awareness drops 
significantly which may result in the theft of important information or the destruction of essential 
means of cybersecurity and the assets they protect.  Another example the team discusses is 
deviations from the company’s policies and procedures.  Lack of knowledge of company 
procedures or carelessness/negligence of standard practices can lead to breaches in the system 
and the destruction or theft of assets.  The team states that lapses in judgement regarding these 
procedures and practices can be categorized in four ways: unintentional acts (‘I didn’t mean to 
do that.’); unintentional failures to act (‘I forgot to do that.’); intentional but incorrect acts (‘I 
thought that’s what I was supposed to do.’); intentional but incorrect failures to act (‘I didn’t 
think I was supposed to do that.’)” (2013, p. 18).  Finally, in their foundational study, the team 
lists acts committed by unintentional insiders that can lead to serious negative consequences, 
including the accidental disclosure of information, unintentionally aiding an outsider by falling 
for phishing and other online scams, and even losing physical devices which may store important 
information such as a USB drive, phone, etc.   
Having discussed the multiple types of insider threats as well as the many definitions of 
insider threats, it is now possible to create a working definition of insider threats that will be used 
for this paper:  
An insider threat is an employee or anyone (past or present) given permissible 
access to a company’s assets, (whether physical or virtual) who unintentionally or 
with malicious intent causes significant damage to the company and its reputation 
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through the release of essential, confidential information or the partial or complete 
destruction of its assets.  
Having properly defined insider threats, the many identifiable personal, physical, and 
psychological traits of insiders, as well as the motivators that drive them must be discussed.  By 
identifying these traits, an organization will be better prepared for a proactive response rather 
than a reactive response to insider threats.   
Insider Threat Characteristics 
  Many studies conducted in the past regarding insider threats have shown that individuals 
who become insiders, whether adversarial or unintentional, tend to exhibit certain personality 
characteristics and personal predispositions that differ from other employees and identify them as 
insiders (Butavicius et al., 2012).  Carter et al. states that if companies are able to statistically 
identify these characteristics, motivations and actions, then they will be able to properly establish 
different protection protocols that reduce the likelihood of an insider attack (2012).  However, it 
is possible that other employees may exhibit some of these same characteristics without the 
predisposition of committing an insider attack (Butavicius et al., 2012).  It is essential that the 
company identifies the individuals who exhibit these characteristics and traits, monitor them 
closely, and distinguish between the two.  It is also essential that the company ensures its 
employees understand that these types of behaviors and actions can be a conduit through which 
insiders can gain information from others (Department of Homeland Security National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, 2014).  The purpose of this section is to 
list and describe these identifiable characteristics, behaviors and motivations of insider threats.   
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 There are a number of different characteristics and personality traits that can distinguish 
insider threats from normal employees.  In their article, Butavicius et al. cite a study conducted 
by Kowalski, Cappelli & Moore at Carnegie Mellon which focused on the characteristics, 
motives, and behaviors of insiders, more specifically in the IT department of the organization 
(2012).  In this study, Kowalski et al. state that there was no single profile that could be used to 
describe an insider.  The race, age, and ethnic backgrounds of the insiders varied considerably.  
However, they do present a few noticeable characteristics and personality traits of the identified 
insiders.  They state that the insiders were predominately single males who had not been 
previously married; almost half of the insiders had prior arrest records; approximately half of the 
insiders were current employees and half were past employees of the company; and that the 
majority were employed in IT positions (Butavicius et al., 2012).   
 Another study cited by Butavicius et al. regarding insider threat characteristics and 
behaviors was conducted by Coldwell in 1993.  In this study, Coldwell places significant 
emphasis on the feelings of frustration exhibited by insider threats.  Coldwell discusses how 
these feelings of frustration are usually the result of negative social interactions either at home or 
in the workplace.  He states that these feelings of frustration can lead to computer dependency 
and isolation which, in turn, leads to a decrease in social skills.   
 Butavicius et al. discuss many other personal characteristics and traits (or vulnerabilities 
as they call them) inherent in insider threats.  These characteristics and traits include 
“introversion, social and personal frustrations, ethical flexibility, reduced loyalty, entitlement and 
lack of empathy” (2012).  They explain that insiders tend to exhibit a combination of these 
characteristics and traits, thus making it easier for managers and other employees to identify 
them.  One final thing discussed by Butavicius et al. is a study conducted by Fischer in 2008.  
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Fischer states that insider threats tend to exhibit the same types of characteristics, traits and 
behaviors as spies who commit espionage.  He states that by understanding the types of 
characteristics, traits and behaviors that these individuals exhibit, companies can easily identify 
potential insiders.  Although this paper is focused around insider threats and not individuals 
committing espionage, its’ still an interesting concept that could merit future research.   
 The Center for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) researchers provide their 
own statistics regarding insider characteristics and traits in their 2013 data collection study.  
When conducting research on insider threat cases, they state 82% were male; 49% were between 
the ages of 31 and 45; 88% were permanent staff; and 60% were individuals who had worked 
there for less than five years (2013).  The researchers proceed to list and explain a multitude of 
different personality traits.  These include immaturity; low self-esteem; amoral/unethical; 
superficial; prone to fantasizing; impulsive; manipulative; lacks conscientiousness; emotionally 
unstable; and even present evidence of having some form of psychological or mental disease 
(2013).  Other traits that the researchers discuss include drinking/drug/gambling problems, a 
recent negative life event, such as a death in the family, and showing signs of stress, such as 
having a bad temper and a poor work attitude (2013).  Because of these characteristics and traits, 
insiders usually exhibit observable behaviors that other employees should be watching for.   
Insider Threat Behaviors 
 Insiders appear to exhibit different observable traits in the workplace.  When discussing 
insider behaviors, Butavicius et al. cite three different studies based around this topic: one 
conducted by Kowalski et al. in 2008; one conducted by Shaw et al. in 1998; and one conducted 
by Moore et al. in 2008.  In their study, Kowalski et al. state that in 52% of the insider threat 
cases they studied, there were noticeable online activities that these individuals were conducting.  
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These activities included sabotaging data backups, creating false accounts, and downloading 
malware (Butavicius et al., 2012).  Shaw et al. discuss a behavior mentioned previously: 
computer dependency.  They explain that computer dependency is when an individual spends 
such a significant amount of time on the computer that it begins to have negative effects on that 
individual’s daily life.  They state that this type of observable behavior should alert companies 
about a potential problem (2012).  Moore et al. discus many types of insider threat behaviors.  
These behaviors include inappropriate social interactions, such as bullying and poor hygiene, and 
violating company rules and policies (2012).  Another pattern of behavior that Moore et al. 
emphasize is the creation of digital access pathways into company databases and other sources of 
information.  Once terminated, insiders would be able to access these pathways (or backdoors) 
from outside of the company’s network/system (2012).   
 The CPNI also provides a list of observable behaviors in their study, which include 
actions such as irregular copying and IT activity.  Essentially, this means that the insider 
reproduces sensitive material when unnecessary or unauthorized.  The audit of the insider’s 
system would also show irregular activity such as conducting key word searches in databases 
that the individual has no need to know (2013).  Other behaviors include the unauthorized 
handling of sensitive information, as well as the complete violation of security protocols (2013).   
 The U.S. Secret Service and Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute 
CERT Program conducted a study centered on identifying and managing insider threats.  In this 
study, they emphasize the fact that the insiders who turned adversarial exhibited many 
observable behaviors prior to their attacks.  In their case study, they found that eighty percent of 
employees exhibited warning signs, such as “tardiness, truancy, arguments with coworkers, and 
poor job performance. Insiders who committed IT sabotage held technical positions” (Cappelli et 
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al., 2007, p. 5-6).  They also found in their study, as stated with other cited case studies, that a 
majority of these individuals had set up backdoor access pathways prior to termination in order 
to gain access post termination.   
 Another critical, observable behavior is verbal behavior.  Limited research has been 
conducted on the use of language as a warning sign of an insider attack, but those who have 
discussed it have done so extensively.  In his case study, Schultz explains that aggressive verbal 
behavior, either written or spoken, can be an indicator of an imminent attack.  An example he 
gives is an email containing aggressive or hostile language directed at a boss or a fellow 
employee (2002).  In their case study, Ball et al. focus on detecting insiders through language 
exclusively.  The verbal behavior they focus on mainly is the excessive use of first-person 
personal pronouns.  They state that “the use of first-person plural pronouns, or we words, is 
negatively related to distancing and positively related to having a strong sense of community” 
(2013, p. 268).  Essentially, the use of first-person personal pronouns tends to show that the 
individual is beginning to distance him/herself from the rest of the community, which can lead to 
that person becoming self-focused and disgruntled, which can result in an attack.   
 In their article, Ball et al. very briefly discuss the concept they call the “insider threat 
scenario” (2013).  There are five main stages of this threat scenario: exploration; 
experimentation; exploitation; execution; and escape and evasion.  In the exploration stage, the 
insider is beginning to be recruited by self-motivations, another company/organization, or is 
beginning to recruit others.  In the experimentation stage, the insider begins to gather information 
regarding what profitable data can be stolen, as well as the weaknesses of the company’s system 
and network.  In the exploitation stage, the insider utilizes these weaknesses in order to gain 
access to the company’s information.  In the execution stage, the insider collects and extracts all 
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data that is deemed profitable or essential.  Finally, in the escape and evasion stage, the insider 
abandons the system, possibly leaving behind observable traces, access pathways or destructive 
programs.  As mentioned, different behaviors manifest at different stages of the scenario.  If 
companies are able to identify these behaviors, it is possible that they can link them to a specific 
stage of the scenario and understand how far the insider has progressed with the attack.  In fact, 
the DHS briefly discusses five “behavior prediction theories” in their publication Combating 
Insider Threat: General Deterrence Theory (individuals commit the crime if they believe the 
benefits outweigh the costs); Social Bond Theory (individuals commit the crime if their social 
connections are weak); Social Learning Theory (individuals will commit the crime if they 
associate with delinquents); Theory of Planned Behavior (individuals’ intentions are a key factor 
in predicting behavior); and Situational Crime Prevention (if a motive and an opportunity exist, 
the crime will be committed) (2014).   Knowing and identifying the behaviors of insiders is 
essential, but it is also imperative that companies understand the motives behind their actions as 
well.   
Insider Threat Motivators 
 There are multiple motivators that drive employees to become insiders.  There may be a 
single motivating factor driving an insider, or a combination of factors.  Butavicius et al. cite 
Kowalski et al.’s (2008) case study, which stated that revenge was the strongest motivating 
factor, followed by financial gain, dissatisfaction with company policies, and the desire to bring 
information to a new company (2012).  Butavicius et al. list a number of other motivating 
factors, such as a feeling of entitlement to certain information or other means of personal gain; 
disgruntlement from a negative event, such as unmet expectations, a demotion, a negative 
interaction with another employee, and even a lack of acknowledgement for an accomplishment.; 
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and also a lack of loyalty presented to the company.  According to Ball et al., “in their analysis of 
espionage cases in the 1990s, Herbig and Wiskoff (2002) found that divided loyalty was the most 
common reason for insider activity” (2013, p. 268).  Other motivations may include ideology, 
psychosis, or recruitment (Biringer et al., 2007).  In his journal publication, Colwill explains how 
economic and cultural changes can lead to fear and uncertainty, which can lead employees to 
turn insider (2009).  Finally, an interesting motivator discussed by Steele and Wargo is laziness.  
They state that employees may turn unintentional insider by cutting corners and circumventing 
certain policies due to laziness. By doing this, these employees open the company’s systems up 
to serious security breaches (2007).   
 In a majority of the cases reviewed for this project, the researchers have stated that these 
behaviors were present and identified, but nothing was done to prevent the attack.  The private 
(and even public) sector needs to understand that “no one is immune” and that “anyone can be a 
victim” (Magnuson, 2013).  Because of this, it is imperative that companies have different 
preventative means of security implemented, both technological and human, in order to be 
optimally prepared for when an attack occurs.  Some of these technological means will be 
discussed in the next section.   
Technological Approach   
Technology plays a key role when it comes to preventative security measures.  With the 
use of technology, security personnel are able to identify possible attacks, trace the attack back to 
the attacker(s), and prevent the attack from happening.  However, this can be difficult when it 
comes to insiders.  It can be argued that “the greatest challenge to any security system is 
protecting against the insider threat” (Biringer et al., 2007).  The reason for this is because, as 
discussed previously, insiders have complete access to the company’s network and systems.  
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Insiders are able to identify vulnerability points within the security system and gain access to 
restricted areas.  Because of this, it is essential for companies to implement layers of 
technological security.  By implementing multiple means of security, the number of accessible 
vulnerabilities is reduced, thus preventing insiders from attacking (Department of Defense, n.d.).   
Intrusion Detection Systems 
 One of the primary examples of preventative technology is Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDS).  According to Liang et al., “Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are deployed to detect 
live (in real-time) attacks on network and host systems by using a database of past attack 
signatures” (2012, p. 186).  They state there are primarily two types of IDSs: anomaly based (this 
type of system identifies behavior that deviates from the norm); and signature based (this type of 
system compares the audit logs of the company to a list of well-known attack signatures and 
determines whether or not there is a threat) (Liang et al., 2012).  Something to note is that the 
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency has begun testing a new anomaly based intrusion 
detection system known as Anomaly Detection at Multiple Scales; this system would allow the 
IDS to sift through massive quantities of data very quickly in order to identify strange behaviors 
almost as soon as they occur (Liang et al., 2012).  This system could be efficient for companies 
to implement given that it normally takes extended periods of time to sift through vast amounts 
of data.  As mentioned with the multiple layers of security, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
explains that there should be multiple layers of IDSs within a security system in order to ensure 
optimal protection (n.d.).    
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Honeypot Technologies 
 Another means of security based technology is the use of honeypot technology.  
According to Spitzner, “A honeypot is an information system resource whose value lies in 
unauthorized or illicit use of that resource. What this definition means is that honeypots derive 
their value from threats using them. If the enemy does not interact or use the honeypot, then it 
has little value” (2003, p. 1).  Honeypots are digital objects or locations, such as Microsoft Word 
documents, databases, and others that are created for the sole purpose of catching adversaries 
(Liang et al., 2012).  Honeypots can even be login credentials and credit card numbers (Spitzner, 
2003).  Honeypots have no production value whatsoever.  Essentially, honeypots are digital bait 
traps for insider threats (in the past they have been solely used for detecting outsider attacks but 
are now being used more often for insider threats).  There should be absolutely no interactions 
with these digital entities, and thus, as soon as contact is made with a honeypot, the individual 
should be considered an insider attempting to attack (Liang et al., 2012).  A potential 
disadvantage of honeypot technologies is that they only collect data while they’re being 
interacted with; they do not collect vast amounts of data across the network or system.  There are 
also many uses for honeypots.  They can be used to track fraud or theft, capture intelligence on 
potential attacks, and even prevent automated attacks (Spitzner, 2003).   
 There are three main types of honeypot technologies: honeypots; honeytokens, and 
honeynets.  Honeypots are the most basic of the technologies.  These are the digital entities, such 
as documents and databases, that companies create in an attempt to catch adversarial insiders.  
Honeypots help reduce the amount of alerts received from possible threats, as well as the amount 
of false positives reported given that they only alert when they have been interacted with.  This, 
along with the fact that they require minimal resources, makes honeypots efficient when it comes 
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to digital security.  What also makes honeypots an efficient means of security is the fact that they 
still capture and report activity even when it is encrypted (Spitzner, 2003). 
The second type of honeypot technology is honeytokens.  These are essentially the links 
that lead insiders to the actual honeypots.  Honeytokens can range from simple created 
hyperlinks to false log in and password information.  Interesting enough, honeytokens can 
essentially be honeypots themselves; that is, honeytokens can be false documents and databases 
that lead an insider to the actual honeypots.  What makes honeytokens efficient is the fact that 
they are extremely flexible and easy to change.  They can be easily customized to fit any 
environment necessary (Spitzner, 2003).   
The third type of honeypot technology is honeynets.  Honeynets are the most advanced 
and complex type of honeypot technology.  Rather than a single computer or a specific 
document, honeynets are a large network of computers.  Essentially, honeynets are massive 
networks that contain multiple honeypots and honeytokens.  According to Spitzner, honeynets 
are used to gather more information than simple honeypots, such as who the insider is, possible 
motives, and whether or not the individual accessing it has malicious intent.  Security managers 
are able to put any information they deem appealing to insiders within these networks, much like 
a honeypot or honeytoken, making them very flexible and customizable (Spitzner, 2003). 
Although the use of honeypot technologies can be an efficient means of security, there 
are some disadvantages to using them.  One of these disadvantages is the fact that security 
managers must make honeypots enticing enough for insiders to interact.  As mentioned, 
honeypot technologies have no use if the insider does not interact with them.  Thus, it is up to 
security personnel to make sure that honeypot documents, netowrks, etc. are as enticing to 
insiders as possible (Spitzner, 2003).  Another potential disadvantage is if the insiders discover 
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that the documents or networks they are interacting with are honeypots.  If this occurs, the 
insiders would be able to implement bogus information which could lead security personnel in 
the wrong direction.  That is why it is essential that the least amount of people know of the 
honeypot’s existence (Spitzner, 2003).  Panda and Yaseen (2012) state that using honeypots to 
catch insider threats is ineffective given their knowledge of the network and systems and the fact 
that they utilize their access privileges to make use of pathways that are very difficult to identify 
by security mechanisms.  A proper response to this argument is that honeypot technologies are 
created for the sole purpose of enticing insiders without their knowledge.  No matter what 
pathways insiders choose to make use of to gain access to certain documents, databases, etc., if 
there is strategic placement of incognito honeypots all throughout the system, then the insider 
will be more likely to interact with these honeypots and less likely to evade detection. 
Another beneficial use of technology is the use of auditing, authorizing and logging 
users’ activity within the network.  Security personnel may be more likely to identify insider 
threats by auditing their network activity and comparing it to known patterns of adversarial 
insider activity (Ball et al., 2013).  Auditing may also include the identification of common 
behavior of certain users, making it easier to identify irregular activities or behaviors (Slocombe, 
2014).  Not only must employees be audited and monitored, but the properties of individual 
documents (such as the information they contain and even how many times and for how long 
they were accessed) must also be examined and taken into consideration in order to determine 
whether or not they are playing a role in an insider attack (Andrews et al., 2004).  Companies 
must also ensure that certain employees are authorized to gain access to certain systems, 
documents, etc. through authorized devices.  According to Slocombe, this is one of the primary 
means of cyberattack prevention (2014).   
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Other Technological Approaches 
Other basic forms of technology that can aid in the prevention of insider threats worth 
mentioning include firewalls and virus scanners (DOD, n.d.).  Steele and Wargo discuss the 
importance of a secure, encoded communication software as well.  The U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security also provides an extensive list of security technologies for preventing insider 
threat attacks in their advisory report “Combatting the Insider Threat” (2014), such as data 
access monitoring and control, data loss prevention, crowd-source security, etc.   
Many companies rely solely on technology as a means of protection against insider 
threats.  Because of their advanced knowledge of the company’s network, systems and means of 
security, technology alone cannot prevent insiders from attacking.  Although technology plays a 
major role in the prevention of insider threats, it takes a more holistic approach from the entire 
company in order to prevent insider threats more efficiently, as well as be better prepared for 
when they do occur.  One way in which companies can do this is through the implementation of 
effective security management by using risk management documents, such as the Department of 
Homeland Security’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2013, as well as conducting risk, 
threat and vulnerability assessments.   
Risk Management 
 NIPP 2013 Risk Management Framework 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is a document produced by the 
Department of Homeland Security in an effort to “Identify, deter, detect, disrupt, and prepare for 
threats and hazards to the Nation’s critical infrastructure” (something to note is that the NIPP 
discusses the protection of critical infrastructure; for the sake of this paper, critical infrastructure 
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will be substituted with companies’ information, technology and human assets) (2013, p.1).  In 
order to do this, the NIPP emphasizes the importance of effective risk management.  The risk 
management framework is designed to be flexible, meaning it can be used throughout the public 
sector (government agencies) as well as the private sector (privately owned companies).  It is 
also intended to be used in changing security environments given that risks, threats and hazards 
are constantly changing (2013).  This is important given that insider threat pathways within a 
company’s system are also constantly changing.  The NIPP lists and explains five steps of its risk 
management framework: set infrastructure goals and objectives; identify infrastructure; assess 
and analyze risk; implement risk management activities; and measure effectiveness. 
 In step one of the risk management framework, the company identifies and sets 
infrastructure goals and objectives.  Essentially, these are the end goals that the security 
managers desire for their company (2013).  In this case, the end goal would be the protection of 
company assets from insider threats. 
 In step two, security managers identify those assets they wish to protect.  These assets 
must be essential to the continued operation of the company; that is, if these assets were stolen or 
destroyed, the company would shut down.  The NIPP states that not only should security 
managers identify those assets which ensure the continued operations of the company, but also 
the operations regarding the delivery of products and services to its customers (2013).  Once 
identified, risk managers label the criticality of the assets to the company.  In this case, the assets 
would focus on information vital to the company’s mission. 
 The third step of the risk management process is assessing and analyzing risk (this 
process will be explained more thoroughly in the next section regarding THIRA).  The DHS’s 
Risk Lexicon defines risk as “the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, 
32 
INSIDER THREATS 
event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences” (2010, p. 
27).  The NIPP explains that a risk assessment is a tool used by security managers in order to 
inform their own decision making regarding protective and responsive means of security.  
Essentially, risk managers identify all possible risks to their companies and assets and label these 
risks either quantitatively (number scales that the company has determined) or qualitatively 
(usually low, medium, and high) based on their criticality and likeliness to occur.  In order to do 
this, however, companies constantly obtain new and reliable information regarding their 
vulnerabilities, the risks that threaten them and the consequences that may result in an attack.  In 
this case, the security managers would identify who is at risk for turning adversarial insider on 
the company, how likely is it for these individuals to cause damage, and what the results would 
be if they did.   
 The fourth step is to implement risk management activities.  Once security managers 
have identified and labeled their assets and the risks that threaten them, they implement risk 
management activities to “Identify, Deter, Detect, Disrupt, and Prepare for Threats and Hazards . 
. . reduce vulnerabilities . . . [and] mitigate consequences” (2013, p. 1) based upon the criticality 
scores of their identified assets and risks.  In this case, security managers may implement certain 
policies regarding the use of or access to certain technologies and information systems in an 
attempt to prevent insider threats.  Something security managers must take into consideration at 
this step is the cost of these risk management activities.   
 The final step in the risk management process is to measure the effectiveness of the risk 
management activities.  Essentially, security managers whether or not the means of risk 
management aid in the accomplishment of their objectives and goals identified in the first step.  
If they do, then the risk managers have accomplished their goal of risk management.  If they do 
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not, the risk managers must identify flaws in the process.  One final note regarding the NIPP’s 
risk management process is that it is a continuous process; that is, due to the constant changing 
nature of risks and threats, as well as their possible vulnerabilities, companies must constantly 
identify, analyze and updating their information regarding their assets, vulnerabilities, risks, 
threats and management activities to ensure optimal protection.   
Risk Assessment 
  Another means of protection against insider threats is the Threat and Hazard 
Identification and Risk Assessment process (THIRA).  The DHS Risk Lexicon defines a risk 
assessment as a “product or process which collects information and assigns values to risks for the 
purpose of informing priorities, developing or comparing courses of action, and informing 
decision making” (2010, p. 28).  The NIPP compliments the THIRA process regarding risk 
identification and prevention given that the THIRA process utilizes the five core capabilities 
described in the NIPP: prevention; protection; mitigation; response; and recovery (DHS, 2013).  
Essentially, the THIRA process is a tool used by communities (or in this case companies) in 
order to identify their capability targets and resource requirements for possible risks (DHS, 
2013).  Like the NIPP, the THIRA process is very flexible and can be used in a multitude of 
different environments.  In the DHS’s Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment 
Guide, it states that in order for the process to be efficient, the entire community (company) must 
be actively involved (2013).  There are four steps in the THIRA process: identify the threats and 
hazards of concern; give the threats and hazards context; establish capability targets; and apply 
the results.   
 The first step of the THIRA process is to identify the threats and hazards of concern.  In 
this step, the company would develop a list of site-specific threats and hazards that could cause 
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damage to the company and its assets.  This list defines different types of threats and hazards to 
identify, as well as different factors to consider when defining the list (DHS, 2013).  Companies 
should utilize a number of different sources to ensure that all possible threats and hazards have 
been identified.  Once that is complete, they should only include those threats and hazards that 
have been identified to be the most likely to occur and to cause significant damage to the 
company and its assets (DHS, 2013).  Regarding insider threats, the company would focus solely 
on “Human-caused incidents, which result from the intentional actions of an adversary, such as a 
threatened or actual chemical attack, biological attack, or cyber incident” (DHS, 2013, p. 6).  The 
company would identify different threats that the adversarial or unintentional insider would pose 
to the company, how likely these actions are to occur, and the significance of an attack.  These 
threats could include the different pathways that insiders would take in order to infiltrate and 
steal information from systems.   
 Step two of the THIRA process is giving the threats and hazards context.  In this step, the 
company is simply adding context to the identified threats and hazards from the first step.  
According to the DHS’s THIRA guidebook, “context descriptions outline the conditions, 
including time and location, under which a threat or hazard might occur” (2013, p. 9).  It states 
that, because the conditions will differ, companies should develop more than one context 
description for each threat (2013).  Regarding insider threats, context may include who could 
possibly conduct an attack, when they may attack and under what circumstances i.e. their 
pathways.   
 The third step of the THIRA process is to establish capability targets.  According to the 
guidebook, “capability targets define success for each core capability based on the threat and 
hazard contexts developed in Step 2” (2013, p. 23).  Core capabilities refers to the five core 
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capabilities described earlier (prevention, protection, etc.).  Capability targets define both the 
impacts and desired outcomes of the threats and hazards identified in the previous steps.  The 
impact defines how a threat or hazard will affect a company’s core capabilities, whereas the 
desired outcome defines the timeframe and level of effort necessary to successfully deliver the 
five core capabilities (2013).  Because it defines the success of the core capabilities, the 
guidebook states that the capability targets should be measurable, whether quantitatively or 
qualitatively depending on the company’s preference (2013).  Regarding insider threats, the 
company would identify the impact of an insider attack on its network and systems as well as the 
timeframe it would take in order to successfully deploy the five core capabilities in order to 
properly prepare for, prevent and respond to insider threats.   
 The final step of the THIRA process is applying the results.  In this step, the company 
identifies the resources required to meet the capability targets (DHS, 2013).  Each company 
should identify exactly what combination of resources provides optimal protection from insider 
threats, as well as response to insider threats should they occur.  These can include certain 
technological means of security such as intrusion detection systems and firewalls, updated 
policies and procedures, and even different means of copying information and data.   
 Threat Assessment 
 Another means of identifying and preventing insider threats is conducting a threat 
assessment.  A threat can be defined as any natural, man-made or technical action, individual, 
occurrence, etc. that has the potential to harm life or other assets (DHS, 2010).  The DHS Risk 
Lexicon defines a threat assessment as a “product or process of identifying or evaluating entities, 
actions, or occurrences, whether natural or man-made, that have or indicate the potential to harm 
life, information, operations, and/or property” (2010, p. 37).  A threat assessment is essentially a 
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simplified version of the THIRA process; that is, where the THIRA process focuses on 
identifying potential threats and hazards, the conditions of the threat and hazards and the 
response and resources of the company, a threat assessment simply identifies the threats and 
undesired events that may occur.  According to Biringer et al., “estimating the threat potential for 
the insider threat is probably the most daunting task of security risk managers.  The task is 
socially, politically, and legally sensitive, and it is technically challenging to protect against the 
trusted insider” (2007, p. 69).  Biringer et al. state that the insider threat spectrum (that is, who 
has the possibility of being an insider threat and the possible actions they will undertake) must be 
defined in order to establish an efficient security protection system (2007).  As with the NIPP 
2013 risk management process and the THIRA process, an insider threat assessment should 
quantitatively or qualitatively define the levels of risks and threats for possible insiders, 
qualitatively being the preferred (levels of low, medium and high).  Once the possible insiders 
have been identified and their actions (undesired outcomes) analyzed, the company will have 
essentially defined which categories of employees are more likely to turn insider.  Something 
important to note that Biringer et al. discuss is that “all employment positions at a facility should 
be included in the threat analysis.  Any employee may pose a potential insider threat, even 
trusted managers and security personnel” (2007, p. 334).   
 Vulnerability Assessment 
 One final means of identifying and preventing insider threats is the conducting of 
vulnerability assessments.  The DHS Risk Lexicon defines a vulnerability assessment as a 
“product or process of identifying physical features or operational attributes that render an entity, 
asset, system, network, or geographic area susceptible or exposed to hazards” (2010, p. 39).  
Companies may hire an outside assessment agency or use their own security manager(s) to 
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identify and assess different vulnerabilities within the company that may pose a threat to its 
assets.  Dr. Ryan Baggett, a Homeland Security professor at Eastern Kentucky University, states 
that “Protective Security Advisors are available in every state to assist with infrastructure 
security and resilience needs.  Upon request, the PSA will conduct a site assistance visit at the 
critical infrastructure site” (personal communication, October 15, 2016).  He goes on to state that 
the assessment tool that the PSAs (and possibly security managers) use evaluate “six components 
within the categories of information sharing, security management, security force, protective 
measures, physical security and dependencies” of the company (personal communication, 
October 15, 2016).  Regarding insider threats, the company should focus on cybersecurity and 
possibly even physical security.  Once all vulnerabilities have been identified and assessed, the 
company will be able address these issues and improve its security.   
 The use of government documents and guides such as the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan, as well as the conducting of risk, threat and vulnerability assessments can be 
effective in identifying and preventing insider threats.  However, in order to mitigate threats, 
companies must take a more holistic approach to the issue.  By taking a holistic approach, 
companies will not only update policies and training, improve the work environment, and ensure 
the best employees possible are employee, they will also include every employee and department 
within the company to ensure that everyone is properly prepared for and protected against insider 
threats.   
Holistic Approach 
 As discussed previously, identifying and preventing insider threats cannot be 
accomplished through the use of technology alone.  In fact, Colwill states that “Experience 
shows that an overreliance on technology without consideration of other factors can have 
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disastrous results for managing the insider threat” (2009, p. 186).  In their report regarding the 
thwarting of insider attacks, Magnuson and Sicard state that the last step companies should take 
when attempting to protect information from insider threats is to implement more computer 
programs (2015).  Additionally, they state that companies wishing to improve protection against 
insider threats cannot strengthen one means of protection (such as the use of technology) while 
sacrificing another (such as training) (2015).  In a separate article, Magnuson quotes Douglas 
Thomas, head of corporate counterintelligence at Lockheed Martin Corp, and Dawn Cappelli, 
director of insider risk management at Rockwell Automation, stating that the solution for insider 
threats is not solely technical; rather, “an insider threat program needs to be holistic. It needs to 
look at the person. It needs to looks at technical behaviors as well as non-technical” (2013, p. 
30).  However, in order for this to occur, managers and security personnel need to recognize that 
there is a problem and that the proper steps must be taken in order to prevent it from happening.  
Magnuson and Sicard identify five reasons why executives tend to shy away from the insider 
threat problem: “denial, lack of guidance, complexity, funding and not knowing of the problem” 
(2015, p. 10).  Steele and Wargo add ignoring the threats due to the technological complexity as 
well as the fact that managers may not want to accept that their “family” or employees would do 
such a thing (2007).  Another possible reason could include the complex legal and political 
issues that come with observing employee behavior (Biringer et al., 2007).  Whether it be 
through denial, a lack of knowledge or just ignoring the problem due to its complexity, nothing 
can be done about the insider threat problem until managers accept that it is a growing and 
prevalent issue and take a holistic approach to prevent it from occurring.  One of the ways that 
managers can accomplish this is by updating and posting the company’s security policies.   
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Policies and Procedures 
 Properly posting and explaining the company’s policies and procedures is an excellent 
aid in preventing insider threats.  Something to note is that there is no “one size fits all” stance 
when it comes to security policies and procedures (Steele and Wargo, 2007).  Rather, companies 
must identify their assets and objectives in order to create a solid, efficient list of policies and 
procedures.  Once companies have identified their security needs, it is essential that they clearly 
communicate these policies and procedures to all employees within the company.  Magnuson 
quotes Douglas Thomas stating “there must be a companywide, robust communications strategy 
to let employees know about any counter-insider threat program” (2013, p. 31).  He continues 
quoting Thomas, stating that everyone needs to be included in this “holistic solution” (2013).  
These policies and procedures can be used as a means of deterrence for possible insiders.  In a 
report regarding employee characteristics and cybersecurity policies issued to the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, authors Carter et al. explain deterrence theory as it relates to 
policy violations: “deterrence theory suggests that individuals will be deterred from performing 
undesirable behavior (e.g. crime, computer abuse, policy violation) if they perceive that there 
will be punishments or sanctions which are certain, severe, and swift” (2012, p. 4).  In essence, if 
employees perceive that they will be severely punished for violating the policies and procedures 
explained to them, then they are less likely to do so.  However, in order for this to work 
efficiently, companies must follow through with punishments as swiftly as possible once the 
violation has been identified.  Something important to note is that these policies not only pertain 
to physical and cyber violations; they include anything that they perceive may cause damage to 
the company and its assets, such as drug and alcohol use. 
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Ad/Marketing Campaigns 
 One specific policy that companies should instruct their employees on is the DHS’s “If 
you See Something, Say Something” campaign.  According Reeves, the campaign is “a renewed 
drive to redistribute surveillance responsibilities to the public” (2012, p. 235).  In essence, this 
campaign was created by DHS in order to make it easier for civilians to report suspicious 
terroristic behavior, but it works just as well with employees reporting adversarial insiders.  With 
the implementation of this campaign, employees should be informed on suspicious behavior to 
watch out for, as well as how to determine whether or not a fellow employee is attempting to 
manipulate them into aiding them commit an attack (Colwill, 2009).  However, there are 
negative consequences that coincide with this campaign as well.  Reeves explains that there may 
be legal issues regarding libel that could result in reporting coworkers for insider threat activity 
(2012).  Also, as Magnuson puts it, “nobody likes a snitch”, and therefore employees may be 
reluctant to report others employees, even if they suspect insider activity (2013).  However, if 
employees are properly informed on company policies and procedures, this campaign should be 
a benefit rather than a hindrance in preventing insider threats.   
 Training 
  Along with the lack of policies and procedures is the lack of proper training for 
employees.  According to Colwill, “education, training and awareness are perhaps the greatest 
non-technical measures available and a common theme for human factors and security” (2009, p. 
193).  Instructing employees on the policies and procedures of the company is one thing, but in 
order to be truly effective, old habits must be broken through proper training (Colwill, 2009).  
Martin Hershkowitz puts it perfectly in his report on minimizing insider threats when he states 
that: 
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Training may be one of the most complex but necessary components of an anti-insider 
threat program. In addition to exposing the employees to the extent of the program they 
will be required to undergo in order to be a member of the HS/HD team, all employees 
and management should be trained to recognize those characteristics that imply that the 
individual displaying those characteristics may be a saboteur, terrorist, criminal or simply 
dangerous person for their mission(s) and how to handle the next steps. (2007, p. 110).   
The DHS lists a number of different training programs that companies should utilize in their 
report on combating insider threats.  These programs include identifying phishing and other 
online threats, maintaining proper skill and abilities levels, enhanced awareness of unintentional 
and adversarial insider threats, and even improved use of security tools (2014).  Having said that, 
one of the most essential part of any training program is that the employees understand that the 
programs and their corresponding levels of security are essential for preventing insider threats 
(Colwill, 2009).  If employees believe that the levels of security are overbearing, it could lead to 
reduced loyalty and a greater potential for insider threats.  Thus, the training programs would be 
counterproductive.   
 Human Resources 
 Not only must companies implement proper training programs, but proper investigation 
and examination programs as well.  According to Steele and Wargo, “organizations must realize 
that HR is the first line of defense against malicious insiders. HR must do a better job of 
screening prospective employees. This includes thorough background checks on employment, 
criminal, and credit history” (2007, p. 30).  The Department of Defense explains that companies 
should establish a psychological baseline for employees in order to identify those who may be 
more likely to turn insider.  Once this baseline has been set, it states that all employees in high-
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stress positions should undergo a complete psychiatric examination to determine if they are fit to 
hold their position without turning insider.  It explains that this process should continue every 
two or three years depending on the company’s resources.  The DOD also states that companies 
should be continuously testing for illegal drug and alcohol use as well.  Finally, it discusses the 
importance of conducting thorough background investigations on all employees, including any 
local, state or federal criminal charges and financial information (n.d.).  As mentioned 
previously, these could be possibly motivations as to why employees turn insider.   
 It has been argued by many authors cited in this paper that the holistic approach is the 
key to preventing insider threats.  By taking a holistic approach to the problem of insider threats 
as opposed to relying on technology, all employees become more involved with the mission and 
objectives of the company.  As discussed previously, this feeling of importance and belonging 
can lead to increased loyalty to the company, and thus reduce the total number of employees 
turning insider.   
 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this research paper was to discuss the growing issue of insider threat to 
companies and to explain the importance of using preventative measures of security rather than 
reactive measures.  It was hypothesized that there are certain characteristics and behaviors that 
insider threats exhibit that make them stand out from the rest of the company’s employees.  It 
was then hypothesized that once companies identify these characteristics and behaviors in their 
employees, they would be able to prevent them from comprising the companies’ assets.  The 
third hypothesis was that, once these characteristics have been identified, companies would be 
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more successful at preventing insider threats by using a hands-on holistic approach to the 
preventative means of security along with layers of technological means of security.  Before 
testing these hypotheses, a working definition of insider threat had to be established.  Once that 
was completed, research was conducted on the different characteristics and behaviors that insider 
threats exhibit in the workplace.  The motivations of those who had turned insiders were also 
analyzed as a means of attempting to prevent others from turning insider as well.  There were 
many characteristics, behaviors and motivations identified that separate insider threats from the 
rest of the company’s employees, thus proving the first hypothesis to be correct.  The next step 
was to identify technological means of security that aid in preventing insider threats.  A few of 
these were identified and briefly discussed.  The final step was to identify the means by which 
companies can take a holistic approach to preventing insider threats.  Along with this, research 
was conducted on the effectiveness of these preventative means, showing them to be efficient in 
preventing insider threats from occurring, although not completely.  Because of this, both the 
second and third hypotheses were shown to be correct.   
 The information presented in this study could be reexamined and reused in the future in 
order to determine whether or not these preventative means of security are effective against 
insider threats.  In order to do this, researchers would have to analyze the different preventative 
means of companies and determine how many insider attacks have been prevented and how 
many have succeeded.  This would include not only identifying the detection, prevention and 
auditing capabilities of the technology implemented at the company, but also the security 
policies, training programs and other holistic approaches to the problem.  Researchers must work 
closely with security managers at these companies to analyze and determine the effectiveness of 
preventative means of security.   
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 The reason this research topic is important is due to the amount of physical and financial 
damage that insider threats can cause to a company as discussed in the introduction.  As stated, 
the average insider attack can cost up to fifty times that of an outsider attack, which can be 
within the millions range.  Not only can an attack cause physical and financial damage to the 
company, but to the public and the economy as well.  It is also important given that the insider 
threat issue has been steadily growing since 2004.  Because of this, it is vital that companies 
utilize preventative means of security in order to protect their information (and others) assets 
from attack.   
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